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1 Changing images of the Dark Continent 
At a recent African Studies Association conference in San 
Francisco, I presented a paper on the fi ndings of a research 
project that I was involved in over the last few years on 
Ghanaians in Amsterdam and their ‘good work back home’.1 
The theme of the conference was ‘African Diaspora and 
Diasporas in Africa’ and our panel was entitled ‘Development 
from Abroad’. Panel members presented numerous success 
stories from many parts of the continent and the general 
reaction at the conference was one of surprise at the many 
positive stories coming out of Africa. One of the participants 
in my panel talked about ‘silverlining Africa’ – stories that 
challenge past images of doom and gloom.2
Just before going to the US, I chaired a session at the annual 
meeting of the Netherlands-African Business Council in a 
beautiful conference centre in Wassenaar where close to two 
hundred Dutch entrepreneurs shared enthusiastic accounts of 
their activities in Africa. The overall impression was that Africa 
is taking off and is the newest group of emerging economies 
to be knocking on the door of the global market. There is a 
political and business confi dence in Africa today that reminds 
older observers of the euphoria during Africa’s Independence 
Era fi fty years ago. Africa is now the place to be and certainly 
not a place to avoid. The organizer of the event3 more or less 
suggested that Dutch entrepreneurs would be crazy not to 
invest in and trade with Africa. Discussing the changes in the 
current Dutch development landscape, there was an almost 
triumphant attitude among the participants: ‘now it is our turn 
to eat’.4 But they also tried to be honest and straightforward: 
the new business opportunities need to be used in socially 
responsible, fair and sustainable ways. For some, Africa may 
appear to be a place where quick and dirty money can be 
made. For most entrepreneurs, the idea is that there are major 
opportunities here but that these can only be harvested with 
long-term commitment and involvement.
A month earlier when I was in China giving a lecture, my hosts 
arranged for me to visit the EXPO grounds in Shanghai.5 I 
was particularly interested in the way Africa presented itself 
there. With a few exceptions,6 the African countries were 
housed under one roof in a huge exotic building bustling 
with chaotic activity. The sensual African dances and the loud 
drumming attracted many Chinese visitors, who were amazed 
by so much public indecency. The African market stalls were 
popular although there were Chinese-language banners strictly 
warning customers not to buy illegal fare and English-language 
signs with warnings about not taking pictures. EXPO’s title 
was ‘Better City, Better Life’, but a Chinese advisor who had 
been involved in the early support for the African pavilion 
told me that the Africans were not very keen on sticking to the 
general theme. Many of the African pavilion organizers had 
instead decided to show rural Africa as a paradise for tourists 
and investors with traditional scenes of Africa’s exotic nature 
and people, and as a continent full of resources to exploit. It 
was amusing to see that the Chinese positioned Africa as ‘the 
hottest place under sunlight’, even suggesting that this was the 
origin of the name ‘Africa’.7 
Of course, the positioning of Africa as the ‘hottest place under 
sunlight’ takes on a more contemporary meaning if ‘hot’ means 
‘the place to be’, and not only the Chinese have realized this. 
Not long ago, the continent was seen as lagging behind, a sick 
place full of violence, hunger and disease, and either a threat 
to world stability or a disposable place to avoid. Now its image 
has shifted to one of hope, which is making Africa a hotspot in 
the new geo-political reality of a multi-polar world. The recent 
experiences of a world audience of football fans have also 
played a role in changing people’s image of Africa. Not only did 
South Africa impeccably organize a world event but visitors 
and journalists went home with stories of amazement and 
success. Could this violent and sick continent really be such 
a fascinating and welcoming host? Was it really possible for 
crazy Dutch orange invaders to connect so well with the many 
black football supporters in South Africa’s shanty towns? Have 
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these black, coloured and Indian former victims of Apartheid 
really embraced their white Afrikaner compatriots to the point 
that they could share in this sporting euphoria? Did they really 
cheer with the orange crowd and throw oranges and blow 
vuvuzelas together? Has Africa really changed so much? 
In this address, I will fi rst give an impression of how Africans 
themselves perceive change and development, based on recent 
research in Ghana and Burkina Faso, and will then present 
some positive statistical evidence about Africa as a whole. After 
this, I will sketch my current ideas for the future of the African 
Studies Centre in this era of an emerging Africa, and will end 
with some words of praise and thanks.
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2 Perceptions of change and change agents: African voices
How do Africans themselves perceive development, change 
and the impact of development initiatives? This is the core 
question in an ongoing research adventure of which I am 
the coordinator. The project, Participatory Assessment of 
Development (PADEV),8 is being conducted in northern 
Ghana and southern Burkina Faso at the request of three 
Dutch Christian NGOs – ICCO, Woord en Daad and 
Prisma – but with full academic freedom. The programme 
includes researchers from Tamale University for Development 
Studies and Expertise pour le Développement du Sahel in 
Ouagadougou, staff and Masters students in the International 
Development Studies programme at the University of 
Amsterdam and colleagues from the African Studies Centre 
and the Royal Tropical Institute.9 To date, we have organized 
intensive workshops in nine different districts, six in Ghana 
and three in Burkina Faso. I will present here a fi rst impression 
of the main fi ndings, based on our exciting methodology. In 
a recent debate, one of my gurus, Robert Chambers, called 
it a method that empowers local people to write their own 
development histories.10 
Before I present an overview of our main preliminary fi ndings 
though, let me add a few words about the background to 
this research. It will not be a secret to many in this audience 
that the sector that former Minister Bert Koenders called ‘the 
development industry’ is in trouble. The current negative 
political atmosphere in the Netherlands with regard to 
continued development assistance is threatening for the sector 
and is diffi cult for many foreign observers to understand. 
From the 1930s onwards, Catholic and Protestant missionaries 
from the Netherlands connected religious goals with those of 
betterment and emancipation in Africa. Dutch civil society 
was at the forefront of the global campaign against Apartheid 
and against the remains of colonialism, particularly in the 
Portuguese colonies in Africa in the 1960s. And since the 
1970s the Netherlands has been one of the most prominent 
global players in development assistance and one of the few 
countries to spend at least 0.7% of its Gross Domestic Product 
on international development assistance. The Netherlands 
has been an important bilateral donor,11 a solid supporter 
of multilateral agencies, at the forefront in providing global 
public goods and one of the most important back donors of 
civil society and knowledge centres in many corners of the 
globe. And, more recently, several multinationals with Dutch 
roots have become successful pioneers of socially responsible 
entrepreneurship, particularly in Africa.12 The cosmopolitan 
and empathic outlook of many Dutch people connected 
to these initiatives is one of this country’s intangible assets 
abroad. For many Africans, Asians and Americans, the positive 
profi le of the Netherlands is connected to its development-
oriented activities abroad, of course in addition to the ever-
lasting image created by footballers Johan Cruijff, Ruud Gullit, 
Marco van Basten, and, during the last World Cup, Karate-kid 
Nigel de Jong. So why is this cultural capital suddenly being 
impaired? 
For Europe, globalization and the current fi nancial and 
economic crisis are creating major challenges related to 
maintaining the level of well-being for people at the lower 
ends of the labour market, and in other markets as well. 
The arrival of many immigrants, goods and images that are 
perceived as different is creating feelings of anxiety. Political 
mobilization against people, things and ideas regarded as a 
threat is also taking the form of opposition to spending public 
funds in Europe and on development assistance. Some political 
entrepreneurs are creating an atmosphere of fear and hatred 
against foreigners, and are successfully fuelling a mentality of 
Dutch parochialism, hiding behind the dikes.13 Development 
assistance is one of the targets.
This negative sentiment is being fed by widespread doubts 
about the effectiveness and impact of development assistance 
provided in the past. And some of these doubts are also being 
voiced from within the sector itself.14 In addition, many 
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critical observers are linking development assistance to major 
governance and human-rights shortcomings in receiving 
countries, particularly in Africa. The more benign observations 
are pointing to the dependency syndrome that the practice of 
development aid has often fed. 
There is an outcry for evidence-based studies, and the 
development industry has become one of the most intensively 
evaluated sectors of public spending. Evaluations are taking 
many forms, although there is a tendency to push for 
hegemony with an approach called ‘Randomized Controlled 
Trials’.15 I am not against this attempt but it can only be applied 
in a limited number of domains and, in practice, the research 
and social conditions needed for its success are often not 
present. Our approach in PADEV provides an alternative that 
could be applied in many other domains and is more holistic 
and participatory. 
Of course Africa is huge and diverse. There are places about 
which completely different stories can be told, stories of 
violence and of despair. But let us see what we can learn from a 
relatively peaceful area in two countries that have experienced 
a decade of growth but are still poor, even when compared 
to other parts of their macro region. I regard this area as a 
pars pro toto for a major part of Africa today, knowing that 
generalizations should always be treated with caution. 
The method that we have developed is enabling us to obtain 
a good idea about perceptions of development and change 
over a thirty-year period. It shows how local people value 
development initiatives, external interventions and ‘projects’, 
and gives an idea of their assessment of the impact of these 
development initiatives on people’s capabilities and on poverty 
and inequality. Each workshop is a bottom-up, local-level 
assessment by fi fty opinion leaders from a variety of local 
backgrounds. We have included fi fteen local leaders and are 
involving ordinary people too, a cross-section of society to 
represent men and women, the old and young, Christians, 
Muslims and so-called traditionalists, and people from the 
central areas of a district and from more remote villages and 
hamlets. The groups are made up of a few people with many 
years of education but also people who have never attended 
school, and represent people who are (locally) regarded as rich, 
middle-income and poor.16
I will refrain from a lengthy exposé of our method and 
research design here but would refer you to a guidebook that is 
available on the project’s website.17 It is more interesting now, I 
think, to present an overview of our main fi ndings. And to do 
this, I will follow the six domains of our capability approach.18
In the domain of the natural environment, workshop 
participants reported improvements in agricultural production 
and yield in most areas but a deteriorating environment: 
‘the expansion of crops, livestock, and demands for fi rewood 
and charcoal “eats” our forests, and threatens our wildlife 
and biodiversity’. If we look at the agencies that are trying to 
improve agriculture and mitigate environmental destruction, 
we mainly see Christian and secular NGOs that are operating 
on a modest scale and hear complaints about inactive and 
ineffective government agencies. As far as government agencies 
are concerned, there are a lot of government initiatives that 
local people characterize as ‘bad projects’ in this domain. In 
areas without a history of dedicated NGO involvement in 
assisting farmers, our impression is that people are not only 
reporting major environmental problems but also decreasing 
agricultural productivity. This is all the more depressing 
because the area as a whole has generally experienced 
improved rainfall conditions since the Sahelian droughts that 
ended in 1987. 
In the domain of the physical environment, people are 
reporting a major expansion and improvement in the 
road network and modern buildings. Almost all transport 
improvements rely on the government, assisted by foreign aid. 
The European Union and the World Bank play an important 
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role in Africa by providing loans and expertise in public-works 
projects but China is rapidly taking over as the largest donor 
in this domain. A lot of the building expansion is government 
driven but remittances from the south of Ghana and from 
Côte d’Ivoire are increasingly playing a role too. The electricity 
system is gradually expanding, funded by the government, and 
is offering an alternative to other environmentally damaging 
forms of energy provision. In our research area, the last two 
decades have witnessed a major expansion of the public water 
system thanks to funding from government agencies and 
Christian NGOs. As a result, water quality has improved, there 
are fewer water-borne diseases and the burden on women has 
dropped dramatically. Finally, as everywhere in Africa, there 
has been a rapid expansion in private-sector-initiated telecom 
facilities by companies using the image of socially committed 
businesses as part of their marketing strategies to survive the 
fi erce competition.
In the domain of human capabilities, all the workshop 
participants reported improvements in healthcare facilities 
due to efforts by Christian NGOs and increased government 
health spending. Some of these are supported by foreign aid, 
including assistance from Cuba. The new health insurance 
system in Ghana has enjoyed the support of donors like the 
Netherlands, and has spread surprisingly fast even to the 
most remote parts of the country. There has been a rapid 
growth in primary-education facilities and some increase in 
the number attending secondary school and in the happy few 
who manage to obtain tertiary education. The expansion of 
primary education is mainly thanks to government funding 
and so-called sector support by major development donors 
to the ‘Education for All’ programme that is coordinated by 
UNESCO. Funds provided by remittances and private money 
fl ows have started playing a major role in enabling children 
to continue their education through to higher education. 
However despite this support, primary-school coverage is still 
not 100% and secondary and tertiary education is the privilege 
of a minority.
In the domain of economic activities, people in our research 
areas reported some growth in the private sector, with more 
shops, wholesalers, markets and mobile traders, not least 
because of increased numbers of female traders. These 
small-scale entrepreneurs are generating a host of jobs in 
the informal sector. However, the number of medium and 
large-scale fi rms is still limited, industry is virtually non-
existent and the number of regular, formally paid jobs has not 
increased signifi cantly. There are complaints about the very 
limited role of government agencies in providing or facilitating 
employment and it is generally considered an illusion to think 
that the private sector will provide any real breakthrough in 
remote areas. As a result, many young, relatively well-educated 
people are not working in regular paid jobs or in their own 
companies. Most enterprising young men and women 
are trying to leave the area, which is fuelling a major out-
migration and resulting in a very mobile, fl oating population. 
This is feeding a culture of migration and a strong growth in 
remittances and small-scale investments by current and former 
migrants in their villages of origin, but also in the regional and 
district centres. Mainly thanks to the secular NGOs and the 
charity-driven parts of the private sector, there has been some 
growth in micro-credit facilities and a few large-scale banks 
have started some activities as well, including the Grameen 
Bank from South Asia. 
In the domain of social-political capabilities, people 
everywhere in our research areas in Ghana and Burkina 
Faso are talking about participating in much wider social 
networks than their parents. Their orientation is no longer 
local but national, or even global as a result of the explosion in 
communication possibilities, mainly due to small-scale private 
investments and corporate capital. As a result of massive 
exposure to what is perceived as a ‘better life elsewhere’, 
expectations have been raised and there is growing anger 
among the youth, particularly among young men, about 
the lack of improvement in their position. Economic or 
political entrepreneurs promising heaven on earth can quite 
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easily mobilize them for whatever goals. It is mainly thanks 
to Christian and secular NGOs that the prospects for young 
women seem to be better compared to those of many of their 
male age-mates, and certainly compared to their mothers and 
grandmothers. Women have a much stronger and more visible 
role nowadays and if I compare my visits to remote villages ten 
years ago with my recent experiences, there is a very different 
attitude among women. In terms of political change, people 
note the change to multiparty democracy and the much freer 
expression of opinions. This is linked to the activities of mainly 
secular NGOs, and those in our research population who 
follow the more macro-level debates connect it to demands 
by foreign donors, which they do not appreciate. Western-
style democracy is creating double feelings. On the one hand, 
people are applauding the increased possibilities for local 
involvement in decision-making but they also see the risks 
of more instability and in-fi ghting or political quarrels, and 
they regret the more visible local corruption. Local democracy 
around elected district councils with increased powers and 
more money is also creating tensions with the system of local 
chiefs/chefs, a system that is still very much alive. Government 
leaders are much better educated now than they were thirty 
years ago and many of the local-level state agents see their role 
as representatives of a ‘developmental state’. 
In the domain of cultural change, one can see a rapid growth 
in Christianity and Islam, and a plethora of Christian and 
Islamic organizations and NGOs. However, there are tensions 
between those who adhere to the orthodox versions of 
established creeds and those who mix orthodox with local 
elements. A hybridization of religion is happening everywhere, 
alongside a mixing of other elements of local and global 
cultures.19 In some places, tensions may suddenly erupt but 
the different versions of faith, truth and expected behaviour 
mostly co-exist peacefully. Exposure to different cultures is 
generating a growth in language and psychological abilities, 
and people generally welcome this. One can also see a change 
in dress styles, in preferred house styles and in food habits. 
And there are many, and often confusing, changes in the 
relationships between men and women and between old and 
young. One hears regrets about the ‘youth forgetting our 
age-old customs’. And some of these regrets are constructed as 
forms of resistance to globalization and to ‘western’ education, 
fi lms and music, particularly in Islamic and Orthodox 
Christian circles, and among traditional chiefs/chefs. 
Looking at the overall evidence in our research area, most 
of the change agents are still NGOs and government units, 
certainly not the corporate private sector, unless one takes 
the growth of a remittance culture as proof of a buoyant 
private sector. Our respondents have no doubt whatsoever 
that aid has played an important role as a driver of change 
but they note that this was only the case if aid was embedded 
in agencies rooted in their local environment. Looking back, 
people appreciate most of the externally funded initiatives 
that have improved their lives but during our work it became 
obvious that people not only judge initiatives by the outcome 
or their practical success but also by the quality of the process. 
Then they talk about respect, decent relationships, trust and 
dependability as characteristics in an ‘appreciated’ relationship. 
Participants in each of the nine workshop areas reported 
a minority of ‘bad projects’, initiatives they did not like. 
People talk about ‘bad aid’ being forms of assistance that are 
disrespectful, top-down, without consultation and that create 
trouble without taking responsibility for solving confl icts. 
People know that some desired changes do not come about 
without confl ict, and some of these confl icts can make life 
diffi cult, or even violent. However, they suggest that agencies 
creating such confl icts should also play a role in mitigating the 
effects. ‘Bad aid’ is too quick, is of a hit-and-run nature and 
looks for fast and visible success, which is often not sustainable. 
This type of aid can be found among NGOs and in projects 
initiated by multilateral donors and by the private sector. 
But if I look at the distribution of external initiatives that are 
regarded as ‘bad’ (and included amongst the ‘worst projects’), 
I fear that government agencies in Africa, with or without 
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external back donors, are more often perceived as being 
involved in ‘bad aid’ than NGOs or the private sector. Please 
don’t misinterpret me here: I am not saying that government 
agencies are always bad or that their initiatives are always 
bad projects. I am saying that, in relative terms, in the box of 
(relatively few) projects that are indicated as ‘bad’ projects, 
government projects have a higher likelihood of appearing so. 
On the other hand, good projects are generally seen to be 
initiated by ‘good agencies’. These are agencies with a long 
history of commitment and ones that take their time and are 
fl exible. They dare to experiment, and this also means that 
they dare to fail. As a result, some of the good agencies may 
have some bad projects, but people tend to applaud that: If 
you don’t try, you won’t learn. What people hate is dishonesty, 
also in the way agencies report their successes or failures. 
Good agencies are seen as honest and dependable. They often 
play broker roles: they commit themselves to networking and 
to knowledge exchange. And as has been said before, they 
commit themselves to solving confl icts and helping when there 
are major problems. And among the ‘good agencies’ there 
are relatively many NGOs, compared to the other types of 
agencies.
One conclusion that is overwhelmingly clear from all our 
research activities is that development initiatives are mainly 
improving the lives of people who are regarded locally as 
being in the rich and middle-income groups, not the lives of 
those who are locally seen as poor, and certainly not the lives 
of the very poor. In the discussion about development aid, 
this is a problematic conclusion, as the emphasis of so many 
aid agencies, in the Netherlands too, is on poverty alleviation. 
As a result of the current hegemony of the Millennium 
Development Goals, this means an emphasis on people with 
an income of less than US$1 a day. These are indeed the 
people who are locally regarded as poor and very poor in 
our research areas, and in most of our research districts this 
is close to half the population. The people in the ‘average’ 
wealth category are just above that minimum and the locally 
rich can be considered as those earning between US$2 and 
US$5 a day. Only the few very rich have an income above this 
level, and often very much above it. So, at a world level, the 
overwhelming majority of our research population belongs to 
the so-called bottom of the pyramid if we defi ne this group as 
earning less than US$5 a day. 
It seems that development agencies working in our research 
areas are most successful at directly improving the level of well-
being of the upper part of the bottom of the pyramid, namely 
the people who are not ill or handicapped, who have a slightly 
better level of education, who are more entrepreneurial, 
who have easier access to land, water, and public services, 
and who are better connected to the rich and powerful both 
economically and politically. They are also the ones who are 
not addicted to alcohol or drugs, who do not have excessive 
debts, and who do not have a history of failure or ‘bad luck’ in 
life. The current emphasis in aid agencies on ‘visible success’ 
(with key words like ‘effectiveness’ and ‘impact’) increases the 
chance that development agencies will focus on the locally 
rich and already successful, and fail to commit themselves to 
the poor or the ultra poor.20 In addition to this micro-level 
conclusion, I should add that the current emphasis in the 
leading aid agencies, including those in the Netherlands, on 
budget and sector support to central governments in recipient 
countries is encouraging an emphasis on urban and central 
areas, and is tending to neglect the most needy and peripheral 
areas. One could fear that a shifting emphasis towards aid 
through the private sector will further increase this tendency. 
This is not to say that the distributional effects of aid through 
NGOs automatically produce better results. Dirk-Jan Koch’s 
sobering study points at blind spots on the aid allocation map 
if we look at the geographical distribution of international 
NGOs.21 Our counterargument is that we found activities of 
NGOs, be they of secular, Christian or Islamic background, 
everywhere in our relatively remote research areas. And in 
many places people were reporting the innovative activities 
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of small-scale farmers and business (wo)men, who were often 
investing remittance money. The role of government agencies 
beyond the odd primary school, a water project or a minor 
health dispensary is often quite limited. This brings us to a 
more macro-level analysis of African dynamics. 
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3. A macro perspective on changes in Africa based on global 
statistics22
The perceptions that I have presented so far are based on on-
going research in a small part of Africa. So what about Africa 
as a whole? I am now going to make use of perceptions derived 
from global statistics and will follow the same six domains 
used in the previous section after fi rst presenting some data on 
Africa’s demography. 
In 1650, Africa and Europe had similar-sized populations, each 
having about 100 million inhabitants and each accounting 
for about 17% of the world’s population at the time. By 1900, 
Europe’s economic and scientifi c dominance had resulted 
in its population reaching 600 million or 25% of the world’s 
population. Africa’s population was still 100 million as a 
result of slavery, disease and economic subordination, and its 
demographic weight had dropped to only 4% of the world’s 
population. Today Europe has 750 million people (11% of 
the world’s population), while Africa now has more than 
a billion inhabitants or 15% of the world’s population.23 
Africa’s demographic recovery is truly remarkable, and its 
demographic weight is still growing. Fears that disease, like 
HIV/AIDS, would result in its population contracting are no 
longer founded. UNAIDS recently celebrated the fact that 
annual AIDS deaths are decreasing now and that in the four 
most problematic African countries, the number of new cases 
is 25% lower than ten years ago.24
So let us fi rst look at Africa’s natural environment. Africa 
has 19% of the world’s land area and more than 10% of it 
enjoys some form of nature protection, for what that is worth. 
Between 1961 and 2009 African farmers succeeded in more 
than doubling the area under cultivation from 101 million 
hectares to 209 million,25 which amounts to another 7% of 
Africa’s land area. Most of Africa’s land mass is unprotected 
and uncultivated nature, mainly tropical forests, savannas, 
deserts and semi-desert regions, and most of it is sparsely 
populated. Africa’s cropping data dynamics mirror the eras 
of Afro-optimism and Afro-pessimism. In the 1960s, when 
most African countries had gained political independence, 
Africa’s new governments were embarking on a trajectory of 
rapid economic expansion, dreaming of industrialization and 
development, and often neglecting their agricultural heritage 
and the well-being of their farmers. However, relatively 
benign weather conditions and path dependency on colonial 
modernization and agricultural commercialization schemes 
of the 1950s still allowed an expansion of the continent’s 
cropping lands. The 1970s saw a decline in almost all crop 
lands due to adverse weather conditions and the harsh policies 
that created an atmosphere of rural despair, which is still 
feeding Afro-pessimism today. Findings from the African 
Studies Centre’s Tracking Development project clearly show 
how bad these policies in Africa were. In the same decades, 
South-East Asia and China prepared the ground for their 
economic breakthrough based on state-led policies that 
favoured agriculture and their rural populations.26 The late 
1980s saw a recovery in Africa which continued into the 
1990s, including a rapid increase in the amount of crops sold 
on the world market as a result of increased global prospects 
for Africa’s economy. The last decade has shown steady crop 
expansion, but one very much focused on producing food to 
feed Africa’s own expanding urban populations. If we look at 
the last fi fty-year period as a whole, the acreage of almost all 
African crops has increased considerably.27 Africa has almost 
doubled its cereal area and tripled its production of pulses 
and root and tuber crops. If we consider cereal crops in more 
detail, rice acreage has more than tripled, sorghum more than 
doubled and maize has almost doubled. A rapid expansion 
can be seen in ‘luxury’ tree crops, fruit and vegetables that are 
being grown both for the world market and also for Africa’s 
growing urban middle classes. That Africa has also more than 
doubled its livestock numbers and signifi cantly increased the 
number of chickens kept (which are so important to its female 
farmers) is truly remarkable. Table 1 presents the details.
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Table 1: Africa’s cropping area (million ha) and livestock numbers (in millions), 1961-2009
Crop 1961 1970 1980 1990 2000 2009 Increase 1961-2009 (%)
Cereals 57 67 64 79 88 109 +  91
Pulses 7 11 9 13 16 22 + 214
Roots/tubers 8 11 11 14 21 24 + 200
Fibres 4 5 4 4 4 4 -
Oil crops 17 20 19 20 27 31 +  82
Fruit* 7 10 10 13 16 19 + 171
Total 101 124 117 143 172 209 + 107
Livestock
Chickens 274 395 556 908 1201 1471 + 437
Goats 94 115 141 177 234 295 + 214
Sheep 135 159 185 207 246 292 + 116
Cattle 122 149 172 189 228 271 + 122
Pigs 6 7 10 16 21 28 + 367
Camels 9 12 14 15 18 22 + 144
* This includes melons, sugarcane, vegetables and tree nuts (including cocoa and coffee beans). 
Source: FAO FAOSTAT: Area harvested, Africa total. For livestock: FAOSTAT.fao.org.site/573
Of course the success of agriculture should not only be judged by an expansion in the area under cultivation. Yields are important as 
well, and for yields too the overall picture is generally positive. Over the last fi fty years, African farmers have succeeded in achieving a 
higher yield per hectare for all crops, with the exception of vegetables. The yield increases were most pronounced for fruit and cereals, 
with almost a doubling of average yields. Roots and tubers showed a 61% improvement in yield. Details are provided in Table 2.
Table 2: African crop yields (kg/ha), 1961-2009
Crop 1961 1970 1980 1990 2000 2009 Increase 1961-2009 (%)
Cereals 810 907 1131 1176 1270 1479 + 82
Pulses 499 452 565 553 550 593 + 19
Roots/tubers 5779 6235 6873 7858 8161 9280 + 61
Fibres 264 327 347 368 374 369 + 40
Oil crops 237 214 239 270 264 317 + 34
Fruit 5526 7205 8264 8817 9585 10514 + 90
Vegetables 6835 6071 6005 6245 6624 6885 +  1
Tree nuts 552 543 564 517 742 769 + 39
Source: FAO FAOSTAT: Yield, Africa total 
Italics indicate a lower yield than ten years earlier.
If yield and acreage data are combined, the aggregated results for all major food crops show that Africa is better able to feed its 
population today than it was in 1961, despite its huge population increase over these fi fty years (see Table 3). Both now and then, 
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Africa produced, on average, a little more than the minimum food requirements for a healthy life, as outlined by the World Health 
Organization, although many Africans still do not get enough food every day. 
Table 3: Africa as a whole: population (in millions), crops (in millions of tons), livestock (in millions) and food energy value (1000 
Cal) dynamics, 1961-2009
1961 2009 Change 1961-2009
Population 289 1000 x 3.46
Cereal production 46 161 x 3.49
Pulses production 3 13 x 3.89
Roots and tuber production 46 223 x 4.82
Food energy value per capita 
per year*
841 939 x 1.12
Cattle, sheep, goats, pigs and 
camels
366 908 x 2.48
Chickens 274 1471 x 5.37
 * For cereals and pulses, an average energy value of 3600 Cal/kg was used and for roots and tubers 1400 Cal/kg. Other sources of food 
(and the balance of food exports and imports) are not taken into account. The annual fi ndings for cereals, pulses, roots and tubers would 
mean 2304 Cal/day in 1961 and 2573 Cal/day in 2009. Both are above the minimum average requirement according to WHO data. 
Source: Population: esa.un.org/unpp; crop and livestock data: see Tables 1 and 2.
Behind this silver lining, some dark clouds can be seen as well, for those who want to look. The expansion of Africa’s population and 
agriculture and the concomitant growth of demand for farmland and wood energy have resulted in a major decrease in Africa’s forest 
lands. Between 1990 and 2010, the world lost 135 million hectares of forest land, and Africa was responsible for more than half of this 
loss.28 The area of forest in Africa dropped from 691 million hectares to 616 million hectares in these two decades and its forest carbon 
storage capacity decreased from 60.9 Gigatons to 55.9 Gigatons over the same period.29 And despite Nobel Peace Prize winner Wangari 
Maathai’s pioneering work to promote reforestation in Africa,30 it is still not yet a high priority.31
Let us move on to the second domain of change: Africa’s physical infrastructure. Here there is a real lack of historical data, which 
makes it impossible to assess the major changes in the last fi fty years for the continent as a whole. Various sources suggest an overall 
growth in air transport facilities and far better connectivity for major parts of the continent with outside destinations, but within 
Africa it is still a major problem to get direct fl ights from A to B. The road network is being rejuvenated in many parts of the 
continent, thanks to support from the World Bank and the European Union, and to generous and often remarkably fast-moving 
projects donated and managed by China. The number of vehicles in Africa is increasing too.32 Electricity provision has been slow 
in many countries but, here too, new targets have been set and new investments made. Northern and South Africa have reached 
electricity coverage of more than 80% but all other African countries are still below 50% (including even energy-rich Nigeria), 
and many countries are below 20%. Modern fuel sources are common in North Africa but are relatively rare elsewhere, with South 
Africa’s households in the range of 50% modern fuel usage and most other African countries below 10%. And they are mostly using 
traditional wood fuel or charcoal, to the detriment of the natural environment.33 On a positive note, investments in communication 
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infrastructure are booming, and the explosive growth in mobile phones is rapidly changing people’s connectivity.34 Also on the 
positive side, Africans have much better access to safe drinking water than fi fty years ago.
If we look at the changes in the physical domain, the most fascinating developments have taken place in the urban environment. In 
1960, Africa’s population was predominantly rural, with only 20% of people living in cities. Today its urbanization level is beyond 40% 
and will be approaching 50% soon. Already one in eight Africans were living in an urban agglomeration of more than one million 
inhabitants in 2007. Four of Africa’s mega-cities now belong in the world’s top fi fty most populous centres: Cairo, Lagos, Kinshasa 
and Johannesburg/the Rand.35 More will join the list. These fi gures showing Africa’s urban explosion (see Table 4) become even more 
telling if we remind ourselves that African cities had to provide buildings and living space for only 65 million people in 1960 and that 
this fi gure has now reached 460 million.
Table 4: Urbanization dynamics in Africa (% of urbanization by country), 1960-2007
In 1960 ▼      In 2008
10-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 >70
<10 Burundi
Burkina
   Faso
Ethiopia
Eritrea
Kenya
Lesotho
Malawi
Niger
Rwanda
Uganda
Chad
Tanzania
Mozambique Mauritania
10-19 Madagascar Benin
D.R. Congo
Guinea
Mali
Sierra Leone
Somalia
Zimbabwe
Angola
Côte 
d’Ivoire
Nigeria
Sudan
Togo
Cameroon
20-29 CAR
Zambia
Ghana
Senegal
Liberia
Morocco
Libya
30-39
   
Egypt Algeria Congo Rep. 
Tunisia
40-49 South Africa
Source: World Bank World Development Report 1983 for 1960 (Washington) and WDI. Accessed November 18, 2010. For all other 
African countries data is missing, mostly for 1960. 
▲
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In the domain of human capabilities, the health and education of Africans have improved a great deal in the last fi fty years, although 
Africa is still trailing behind many other parts of the world as far as the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals is 
concerned. The most basic statistic is the one on life expectancy. In 1960, 17 African countries had extremely low fi gures, with average 
life expectancy rates of less than 40 years, with Sierra Leone and Angola at the bottom with an average of only 33 years, mainly due 
to high infant and child mortality rates. By 2008, no African country had life expectancy fi gures in the thirties anymore. From the 
countries that were at the bottom of the list in 1960, seven have improved their life expectancy fi gures to between 40 and 49, and ten 
to between 50 and 59 years. In 1960, the majority of African countries had fi gures ranging between 40 and 50. Of these 29 countries, 
fi ve have remained at this level, and the situation in Lesotho and Zambia has even deteriorated. Fourteen countries have improved and 
now lie in the 50 to 60 age range, six countries have risen to between 60 and 70 and fi ve countries have even jumped to have fi gures 
of an average life expectancy of over 70, which is close to the European average. Finally, the six African countries at the top of the list 
in 1960 had life expectancy fi gures of above 50 years of age. Three of these countries have jumped to the highest category, one almost 
has, one has stagnated (Botswana) and one country has plummeted down the list. This is Zimbabwe, which has been suffering from 
the impact of HIV/AIDS and a severe political, economic and moral crisis. See Table 5.36
Table 5: Changes in life expectancy in African countries, 1960-2008
In 1960 ▼     In 2008
40-49 50-59 60-69 70-79
30-39 Sierra Leone
Angola
CAR
Guinea   
   Bissau
Mali
Mozambique
Nigeria
Gambia
Burkina Faso
Eq. Guinea
Djibouti
Eritrea
Guinea
Ethiopia
Malawi
Somalia
Niger
▲
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40-49 Chad
D.R. Congo
Swaziland
Lesotho (-)
Zambia (-)
Burundi
Cameroon
Ghana
Congo Rep.
Liberia
Côte d’Ivoire
Rwanda
Sudan
Mauritania
Kenya
Senegal
Tanzania
Uganda
South Africa
Benin
Comoros
Gabon
Namibia
Madagascar
Togo
Algeria
Libya
Morocco
Tunisia
Mayotte
50-59 Zimbabwe (-) Botswana São Tomé & Principe Cape Verde
Mauritius
Seychelles
(-) indicates deterioration
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank). Accessed November 18, 2010.
What about education and literacy levels? To compare data for 1960 and 2008, we have access to fi gures for 34 African countries. In 
1960 adult literacy levels were dismally low. In at least 14 African countries fewer than ten out of every hundred adults could read 
and write, even at an elementary level. Many of these countries are still at the bottom of the list, although average literacy levels have 
improved everywhere. At least 19 African countries had adult literacy levels of between 10% and 40% in 1960. These countries have all 
improved their rates considerably and some, like Zimbabwe, to almost universal levels of literacy. In only one African country, South 
Africa, could the majority of all adults read and write in 1960, and it is now close to universal literacy as well. 
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Table 6: African adult literacy rates (%), 1960 and 2008
In 
1960 ▼ 
 
▲
    In 2008
20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-79 80-89 >90
<10 Mali
Burkina 
Faso
Niger
Chad
Ethiopia
Guinea
Benin
Sierra Leone
Senegal
CAR
Mozambique
Mauritania
Liberia
Eritrea
10-19 Morocco Burundi
Sudan
Togo
Nigeria
Malawi
Rwanda
Tanzania
Cameroon
Tunisia
Algeria
20-29 Ghana
Egypt
Uganda
Zambia
Kenya
Libya
30-39 D.R. 
Congo
Zimbabwe
50-59 South
Africa
Source: For 1960: World Bank, World Development Report 1983: 196-197; for 2008: World Development Indicators (World Bank). 
Accessed November 18, 2010; for Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Senegal, Egypt and Algeria, the fi gures are estimates for 2006/2007. There 
are no (reliable) fi gures for many countries for 1960 so they have been omitted.
Higher literary rates are the result of investments in education, particularly in primary education. At Independence few African 
countries had reached a situation whereby more than half of all children aged between six and twelve went to school, and in some 
countries the level was not even 10%. Today at least 70% of children in most countries attend primary school. In 1960, only Egypt, 
Tunisia and South Africa had secondary-school enrolment of more than 10%37 and many African countries did not even reach 3%. 
Nowadays only in two African countries do fewer than 10% of children receive secondary education, and in half of all countries 
between 25% and 50% of children attend secondary school.
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In 
1960  ▼
▲
In 
2008
30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-79 80-89 >90 unknown
<10 Ethiopia 
(D)
Niger (E) Burkina
Faso (D)
Eritrea (C)
Mauritania 
(D)
Somalia
10-19 Chad (D) Mali (C) Burundi
20-29 Sudan Angola Senegal (D) Benin (D)
Tanzania
Sierra Leone 
(D)
30-39 CAR (D)
Nigeria (C)
Ghana (C)
Guinea (C)
Liberia
40-49 Côte 
d’Ivoire
Kenya (C)
Morocco (C)
Mozambique 
(E)
Togo
Algeria (B)
Rwanda
Uganda (D)
Zambia (C)
50-59 Madagascar 
(D)
60-69 D.R. 
Congo
Cameroon Egypt (B)
Tunisia (B)
70-79 Congo
Rep.
>80 Lesotho (D) South Africa 
(B)
Zimbabwe 
(C)
unknown Djibouti
(D)
Guinea
Bissau
Equatorial
Guinea
Gambia (C)
Comoros Botswana (B)
Cape Verde (B)
Gabon
Gabon
Naminia (B)
Swaziland (C)
Malawi (D)
Mauritius (A)
São Tomé &
Principe (C)
Seychelles 
(A)
Libya
Secondary school enrolment 
E < 10%  (2 countries)
D 10-25% (13 countries)
C 26-50%  (12 countries)
B 50-75% (7 countries)
A >75% (2 countries 
Blank no data (at least not since 2000)
Source: WDI. Accessed November 18, 2010. Data for the most recent year provided it was after 2000.
Table 7: Primary-school enrolment in Africa in 1960 and 2008, and secondary school enrolment in 2008
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After a promising start between 1960 and 1970, economic growth was bleak in many parts of Africa between 1970 and 2000, although 
the situation improved considerably in many countries between 2000 and 2009.38 However, patterns of economic growth have varied. 
Although ten countries experienced economic crisis in the period between 1960 and 2000, and some even a complete collapse, there 
were also fi ve countries with remarkably high economic growth over the period as a whole. With a thirteen-fold increase in GDP per 
capita, Botswana could be regarded as an economic cheetah, long before anybody talked about that African equivalent of the South 
East Asian tiger. And indeed economic performance across the board in the last decade has looked much more promising than during 
the previous forty years. However, certainly not all countries have enjoyed success, with some plunging into crisis. Zimbabwe is, of 
course, the most worrying example. But on the whole, the last decade has produced some signs of an ‘emerging Africa’,39 which can 
also be seen in the continent’s poverty level. This is still dismally high, but improving. In 1990, the base year for the Millennium Deve-
lopment Goals, 58% of Sub-Saharan Africa’s population were living below the US$1 per day PPP consumption fi gure. In 2005 this had 
dropped to 51%.40
Table 8: Africa’s economic performance, 1960-2000
In 1960  ▼ ▲ 1960-2000
Collapse
Crisis/ 
Stagnation
Some Growth Growth Rapid Growth
<50% 50-90/
90-99%
100-125% 125-200% >200%
Very poor Burundi Burkina Faso
Malawi
Togo
Lesotho
Poor D.R. Congo CAR.
Chad
Ghana
Niger
Sierra Leone
Benin 
Rwanda
Kenya 
Mauritania
Nigeria
Sudan
Botswana
Average Liberia Madagascar
Senegal
Zambia
Côte d’Ivoire Cameroon
Congo Rep.
Morocco
Zimbabwe
Egypt
Rich Algeria
South Africa
Gabon
Seychelles
Gross Domestic Product per Capita in US $ (Constant $ value 
of the year 2000)In 1960: Very poor: < 200; Poor: 200-400; 
Average: 400-1000: Rich: >1000 US$/capita (2000 value). These 
have not been corrected for purchasing power parity (PPP).
(Severe) crisis countries have been underlined.
Source: WDI. Accessed November 17, 2010. Other countries: 
missing data.
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Table 9: Africa’s economic performance 2000-2009      
In 2000  ▼ ▲ 2000-2010
      Collapse
      <50%
Crisis/
Stagnation 
50-90/
90-99%
Some Growth
100-125%
Growth
125-200%
Rapid Growth
>200%
Very poor Liberia Burundi
D.R. Congo
Malawi
Niger
Chad
Ethiopia
Sierra Leone
Poor C.A.R.
Togo
Benin
Burkina Faso
Comoros
Gambia
Madagascar
Ghana
Mali
Mozambique
Nigeria
Rwanda
Sudan
Tanzania
Uganda
Zambia
Average Zimbabwe Côte d’Ivoire Cameroon
Djibouti
Kenya
Mauritania
Senegal
Lesotho Angola
Rich Gabon
Seychelles
Algeria
Botswana
Congo Rep.
Namibia
South Africa
Swaziland
Cape Verde 
Egypt
Libya
Mauritius
Morocco
Tunisia
Equatorial 
Guinea
Gross Domestic Product per Capita in US$ (Constant $ value 
of  the year 2000)In 2000: Very poor: < 200; Poor: 200-400; 
Average: 400-1000: Rich: >1000 US$/capita (2000 value). These 
have not been corrected for purchasing power parity (PPP).
(Severe) crisis countries have been underlined.
Source: WDI. Accessed November 17, 2010. Other countries: 
missing data.
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In terms of social-political characteristics, numerous 
global lists of desirable features compete for the attention of 
scientists, policy makers and the media. The Africapedia41 
website lists many of these attempts to value Africa’s political 
decency. Just to mention a few: the Democracy Index, the 
Government Effectiveness Index, the Failed States Index, the 
Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance, the Corruption 
Perception Index, the Legal Rights Index, and the Freedom 
Index. These indexes are recent and it is often diffi cult to get 
an idea of long-term trends. However, compared to 1990, 
many more African governments and presidents are in power 
nowadays as a result of multi-party elections, and there is 
clearly a perception of increasing decency. Indexes like these, 
partly originating from Africa itself, do play a role in keeping 
the media, public opinion, the NGO and business sectors and 
governments sharp. And the African Union is also building up 
institutions to deal with the worst cases of abuse.42 I will give 
an overview of the ‘scores’ for Africa on these indexes. There 
is still a lot of room for improvement, at least if you think that 
a successful state, with regular elections and more than one 
party, low corruption, good governance, high effectiveness, 
legal protection for business interests, and high press freedom 
are positive things. Not all Africans are convinced that all of 
these are top priorities though.
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Table 10: Africa’s scores on social-political indexes (no. of 
countries), 2007 or 2008
Index 
 ▼ 
Score 
▲
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
DI 2 11 14 5 10 3 3 1 0
GEI 1 2 15 16 12 3 3 0 0
FSI 4 4 11 13 14 5 0 1 0
MIAG 1 1 2 9 18 9 6 1 0
CPI 13 21 14 4 3 0 0 0 0
LRI 1 5 23 4 3 0 3 6 3
FI 18 24 10
DI  Democracy Index: http://www.eiu.com/index.asp?rf=0  
 (2008)
GEI Government Effectiveness Index: http://earthtrends. 
 wri.org/text/environmental-governance/variable-1278. 
 html (2007)
FSI Failed States Index: http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/ 
 index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=99&I 
 temid=140 (2008)
MAIG Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance: http://www. 
 moibrahimfoundation.org/index-2008/bycountry   
 (2008)
CPI Corruption Perception Index: 
 http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_ 
 indices/cpi/2007
LRI Legal Rights Index (for business, security of borrowing  
 and lending): http://www.doingbusiness.org/  
 ExploreTopics/GettingCredit/?direction=Asc&sort=2  
 (2007)
FI Freedom Index: http://www.freedomhouse.org/  
 template.cfm?page=15 (2007) 
All At the Africapedia website most scores vary from 0   
 or 1 (undesirable) to 9 or 10 (desirable). In table 10 the  
 lowest (‘worst’) score on the source tables get a score 
 of 1, and the highest (‘best’) one or two a score of 9.
Finally, cultural change can be illustrated in many different 
ways but most attention is directed towards religion and the 
overwhelming religiosity of most Africans. I have stopped 
counting the number of times archbishops of one or other 
religious community and very devout Muslims have tried to 
convince me of the special value of their particular creed. It 
is hard to fi nd so-called ‘free-thinkers’ in Africa! So let us see 
what the statistics tell us. But before doing so, I would like 
to repeat Tshshiku Tshibangu’s warning about all religious 
statistics on Africa:43 
Accurate statistics are notoriously diffi cult to come by, partly because 
national censuses are either out-of-date or non-existent, partly because 
rival statistics are an important part of the competition for power, 
partly because there is genuine doubt as to when some who claim to be 
adherents of Islam or Christianity have effectively ceased to belong to 
the traditional religion.
According to a German encyclopaedia,44 the situation in the 
1960s was that 40% of all Africans adhered to Islam, maybe 
30% followed some form of indigenous belief system, 12% 
were Roman Catholic, 9% were Anglican or Evangelical, 6% 
were Coptic or Ethiopian Christians and there were some 
scattered communities of followers of Judaism or Hinduism. 
In 2009, the number of people adhering to the Islamic faith 
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was estimated at 402 million Africans (39%),45 the number of 
Roman Catholics at 158 million (15%),46 the number of Coptic 
or Ethiopian Christians was 41 million (4%) and the number 
of other Christians 288 million (28%).47 This means that 14% 
of Africa’s population can be regarded as being neither Muslim 
nor Christian. But it is obvious to all who have visited churches 
and mosques in Africa that hybrid forms of Christianity or 
Islam and indigenous beliefs are still widespread. If we look 
at the dynamics of religious expansion, we can see that the 
combined Protestant, Anglican and Pentecostal faith groups 
(including the many Independent Churches) grew nine-fold 
between 1960 and 2009, Roman Catholicism four-fold, Islam 
three-fold and Orthodox Christianity in Northeast Africa 
two-fold.48 It is not surprising therefore that South-African 
Anglican Archbishop Desmond Tutu was asking the Roman 
Catholic Cardinals to elect an African Pope at the last conclave 
in 2005.49
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4. What is the future role of the 
 African Studies Centre?
The African Studies Centre (ASC) has been in existence for 
almost 65 years. It started as the scientifi c and library section 
of the Dutch Africa Institute, which also had a business 
networking unit and has now become the Netherlands-African 
Business Council in The Hague. I hope we can celebrate our 
65th anniversaries together in about a year from now. However, 
this will not be a celebration of reaching retirement age. Far 
from it as both centres bustle with youthful energy!
The ASC is one of the most outstanding research and 
documentation centres in the fi eld of African Studies and will 
continue to be so. We are soon to experience another round of 
external evaluation and this critical assessment of the last seven 
years will help us prepare a new fi ve-year strategic plan. People 
have been asking me about the direction the ASC will be taking 
and I have enjoyed numerous internal and external discussions 
on the subject, many of which show signifi cant agreement 
about the most promising route. So let me give you some of 
the ideas behind our current thinking.
In terms of content, the library and documentation centre 
should stick to its attempts to cover the whole of Africa as far 
as the social sciences and the humanities are concerned. It will 
continue to give priority to collecting scientifi c publications 
from Africa itself, and to focusing on comprehensive on-line 
access to everything of value for Africanists all over the world. 
Its unique African Studies Abstracts are accessible online50 and 
I am happy to announce that one of our most prestigious 
publications, the Africa Yearbook, will be a freely accessible on-
line resource soon.51 
The library’s on-line services should be further developed 
in the direction of personalized data access. The function 
of a documentation centre of scientifi c information will 
move towards helping users to make sense out of an ever 
greater and more chaotic supply of knowledge. Researchers 
and documentation specialists at the ASC will be looking to 
provide coverage of the whole of Africa and to connect to all 
other relevant centres in the Netherlands – be they academic, 
business, NGOs, policy makers and/or the media – where there 
is an interest in Africa. 
It is my wish that the community of Africanists that makes 
use of our Centre consists of fellow academics and associates 
from the world of policy, business and NGOs, and also PhD 
and Research Masters students who would like to be connected 
to the Centre as affi liates52. And of course we will continue 
our visiting fellow programme, and our collaboration with 
African partners like CODESRIA,53 OSSREA,54 SANPAD55 
and others. Although we will focus on the Netherlands and on 
Africa, others are very welcome as well, and we already have 
fruitful contacts with colleagues in the Africa-Europe Group 
for Interdisciplinary Studies (AEGIS)56 and in Asia and the 
Americas. I would also like to establish productive connections 
with other area institutes and their directors in and outside 
the Netherlands57 and to work together towards comparative 
approaches in line with current activities, such as the Tracking 
Development project and the IS Academies in which we are 
involved.58 And I hope we can expand our mutually enriching 
relationships with African embassies in the Netherlands and 
Brussels, and with the Dutch embassies in Africa.
It is also sensible to focus our major research activities on 
areas of scientifi c interest where we think we can contribute to 
the frontiers of knowledge. These should be fi elds where there 
will be an interest from our global peers, both in academia and 
in other knowledge centres. We now think there will be fi ve 
domains in which our efforts will probably be most useful and 
we plan to build on the Centre’s current strengths and steer 
them in new directions.
The fi rst domain involves the livelihoods of Africans in 
connection with nature and natural resources for livelihood 
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development, but also connected to people’s capabilities.59 
This is linked to the study of endogenous and exogenous 
forces of innovation and restraint, which shape people’s life 
chances and their well-being.60 Africa’s demographic, economic 
and socio-political characteristics are changing rapidly, as 
we have seen, and I expect further changes in the next few 
decades, with many ups, and defi nitely also some downs, in 
terms of economic growth and well-being, and in terms of the 
ecological and physical content and impact of these dynamic 
changes. And a lot of this will be visible in the changes in 
Africa’s landscape, in access to land, water and nature, and in 
fi erce confl icts over entitlements to Africa’s major resources: 
nature and people. The African Studies Centre can and will 
contribute to the emphasis on food security, agriculture and 
water development, in our government’s new priorities61.
The second domain is related to the fi rst one, but deserves 
special visibility. Africa’s population is hyper-mobile and a 
lot of this mobility will boost urbanization. Africa currently 
has the fastest rate of urbanization of all macro-regions in the 
world and its cities are bustling centres of youthful expectation. 
This makes city life both promising and challenging. We 
have already seen some African cities join the ranks of the 
world’s mega-cities, and more are on their way. Governing 
these cities and managing expectations will be a major task 
for new generations of urban politicians and entrepreneurs, 
and understanding these processes is a major task for scholars 
like the ones at and connected to the ASC. In this expanding 
domain, we can use the expertise our researchers have 
gained on projects like ‘Mobile Africa’ and ‘Connections and 
Transformations’.62 
The third domain has to do with the perceptions and 
identities of Africans themselves and of others about African 
culture.63 How do people express these identities? And what 
about the dynamics of creating, renewing and rediscovering 
identities with regard to language and fashion, religion and 
morality, ethnicity and nationhood, ceremonies and festivities, 
diet/food style and lifestyle, music and dance, architecture 
and the visual arts? How do people form cultural and political 
alliances around these identities? How do identity politics 
include and exclude others and how does identity mobilization 
relate to violence and peace? And how do people perceive the 
many changes that they have experienced? How do they write 
their own histories?
The fourth domain deals with constellations of governance 
arrangements. Our researchers have a lot of experience in 
dealing with the peculiarities of African states at various levels. 
Concepts like the neo-patrimonial state and the developmental 
state are widely used nowadays. However, a focus on the state 
can be deceiving. From a bottom-up perspective, the African 
population has to deal with a mixture of authority structures 
and with a myriad of players with power and infl uence. For 
them, and for researchers, this can be a confusing constellation 
of governance arrangements, in which a lot is not as it appears 
at fi rst sight. And what seems to be normal in Ethiopia can be 
completely different in Senegal or Zimbabwe. Various types of 
state agencies with different levels of scale, diverse civil-society 
agencies, a host of business actors and community-based 
and group-based agencies, legally recognized or not, form 
intertwined networks.64 And the foreign element is manifesting 
itself in many of these agencies and networks. From the North, 
but ever more also from the East and the West.
This leads me to a fi fth and fi nal major domain of study where 
the ASC community could excel and be useful to society. The 
world’s geo-political set-up is changing with the emergence of 
China, India and Malaysia, the changing role of Arab countries 
and Iran, the knocking on Africa’s door of Brazil, and the 
growth of the African Union as a political entity. Africa’s so-
called south-south connections are no longer just happy NGO 
talk but are a stark reality, and not always that happy anymore. 
However, instead of positioning Africa at the receiving end of 
a new global battle for resources, or even a new imperialism, 
Africa’s political and economic leaders do have the capability to 
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negotiate this multi-polar world. And it is obvious that Europe 
and the United States, and their multinational companies, are 
facing a challenge. The study of Africa in the World should 
be a major element of our new research programme,65 but it is 
clear that this should be linked to all other focus areas, as they 
all have elements of global linkages.
Instead of continuing the ASC’s research architecture as 
separate research groups, I think we should consider a more 
fl exible organization. Members of our research community 
could commit themselves to one or more themes, in shifting 
groups of scholars, and with an annual renewal of pledges and 
performance assessment. This would also make it easier to 
connect these research project groups to our library staff and 
to our community of fellows, associates and affi liates in and 
outside the Netherlands. We are going to use the year ahead to 
discuss and formalize these arrangements for the next fi ve-year 
period. And we will also try to broaden our resource base.
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5. Standing on many shoulders
This is my third inaugural address. The fi rst was delivered 
in Amsterdam in 1996. It was about political environmental 
geography and I talked about entitlements to natural resources, 
starting with a case-study from Kenya. Kenya is still part 
of my activities and I owe a lot of gratitude to the people 
who have supported me and helped me to build up my 
expertise over so many years. They include the team around 
our research in West Pokot: Annemieke van Haastrecht and 
Mirjam Schomaker, my PhD promotors Herman van der 
Wusten and Willem Heinemeyer, and people like Rachel 
Andiema, Albino Kotomei, Simon Lokomoriang Lopeyok, 
Huub Hendrix and Paul Mertens in Kenya and later Wiegert de 
Leeuw, Jacinta Chebet and many students and local assistants 
too. My Kenyan adventures broadened when I got a chance to 
coordinate a major collaborative programme with the School 
of Environmental Studies in Eldoret with Charles Okidi and, 
later, Wilson Yabann. Anthropologist Joshua A’kong’a was 
instrumental in my receiving an honorary doctorate from 
Eldoret in 2007, for which I am very grateful. In Amsterdam, I 
was able to develop programmes to study the environment and 
development with support from fi rst Ad de Bruijne and later 
Isa Baud and colleagues like Maarten Bavinck, Mirjam Ros-
Tonen and Fred Zaal. I gradually widened my regional focus to 
include African countries like Ghana and Southern Africa, and 
also India. In Ghana I have been inspired by David Millar and 
Saa Dittoh, and in South Africa by Timm Hoffman and Anshu 
Padayachee. And for many years Robert Chambers, Elinor 
Ostrom, Mary Tiffen and Amartya Sen have been my heroes 
from the scientifi c literature.
My second inaugural lecture was given in Utrecht in 2003 
when I was appointed Professor in the Social Sciences and 
Director of the CERES Research School. Thanks to Arie de 
Ruijter, Lolita van Toledo, Agniet Cools, Ab van Eldijk, Wil 
Pansters and many others, CERES has become an effective 
national research school. I am grateful that Han van Dijk was 
willing to take over after my fi ve-year term at a time when 
national research schools were beginning to suffer as a result of 
a lack of national leadership in research and higher education, 
and due to parochialism in our university landscape. There are 
too many alpha males (and a few alpha females)66 in charge of 
our intellectual heritage and future. CERES also was a bridge 
for me to very interesting research on the impact of climate 
change on drylands, and a bridge to SANPAD in South Africa 
(my thanks to Anshu Padayachee, Jonathan Jansen, Ahmed 
Wadee, Nelke van der Lans and the SANPAD team!). I also 
learned a lot from my work for NWO-WOTRO (thanks Renée 
van Kessel, Henk Molenaar, Willem van Genugten and many 
others). 
As a geographer, I have always been straddling disciplinary 
boundaries but at CERES and WOTRO I learned to appreciate 
the importance of cross- and trans-disciplinary knowledge 
production. I learned to connect academic excellence with 
societal relevance and to work in truly global, multicultural 
settings. I have tried to implement these lessons in the activities 
of the Development Policy Review Network (thanks Jan 
Donner, Paul Hoebink, Mirjam Ros-Tonen, Kim de Vries and 
many others), the activities of the Worldconnectors (thanks 
Sylvia Borren, Koen Kusters, Ellen Lammers, Ruud Lubbers, 
Alide Roerink, Herman Wijffels and many others) and in the 
inspiring environment of the Broker (thanks Frans Bieckmann, 
Rutger Engelhard, Louk de la Rive Box, Evelijne Bruning, 
Rajendre Khargi and the Broker team). And I have also become 
involved in many other positions of knowledge networking: 
within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at SNV,67 ICCO, Woord 
en Daad and Prisma, in Tropenbos International68 and Both 
Ends,69 and on the Curatorium of the Prince Claus Chair for 
Development and Equity.70 In the current political doldrums, 
a lot of these networks are coming together as there is a 
genuinely felt need to make sure there is a better alternative 
than hiding behind these dikes of ours.
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And now here in Leiden, this is my third, and probably last, 
inaugural address, as a Professor in African Development! I am 
enjoying the intellectual atmosphere here and my discussions 
with deans and colleagues at the Faculty of Social and 
Behavioural Sciences and at the Faculty of Humanities. And I 
am enjoying being the director of the African Studies Centre. 
I have known the Centre since the start of my academic 
career and have always enjoyed using its excellent library, 
publications, research and outreach services. And I know I have 
inherited a well-respected institute because its current and 
former staff have made it world famous. I am truly enjoying 
standing on the shoulders of my predecessors. 
The foundations were laid by Professors Idenburg and 
Holleman. The pillars and the roof were built by Peter 
Geschiere, Jan Hoorweg and Wim van Binsbergen. Gerrit 
Grootenhuis was responsible for the kitchen.71 After him, 
Stephen Ellis built an elevator and strengthened the walls and 
Gerti Hesseling, who is still much missed, painted the walls in 
beautiful colours. Leo de Haan started to build a few annexes: 
thanks Leo for connecting the African Studies Centre more 
fi rmly to the world of policy makers and NGOs.
When I applied for the job of director of the African Studies 
Centre, my wife, Annemieke, said: ‘Then you will have your 
hobby job’. If a ‘hobby job’ means that I am supposed to 
enjoy every minute of it, she is right. If her expectation was 
that it would be quiet and relaxing, I am proving her wrong. 
Now she is telling me that I need to calm down a bit. I think 
I should, and I think I can because there are many capable 
people around me. The ASC is privileged to have always 
had dedicated members on its Board of Governors and I am 
extremely grateful to them for appointing me and for their 
ongoing commitment. And the research, library and support 
staff, as well as the visiting fellows and PhD and Research 
Masters students have all welcomed me with warmth – and 
expectations. I am trying to inspire them to continue to do a 
good job. The ASC is lucky to have excellent members in its 
management and scientifi c teams: Jan Abbink, Jan Binnendijk, 
Mirjam de Bruijn, Jos Damen, Dick Foeken, André Leliveld, 
Gitty Petit, and Maaike Westra. The members of the Research 
Masters Board, our Advisory Council and the Netherlands 
African Studies Association (NVAS) deserve a special mention 
here too.72 
Behind all of them, there are fathers and mothers and, for 
many, life partners and children. In my case, the people closest 
to me deserve my last few words: I would like to say a special 
‘thank you’ to my father and mother, and to Annemieke, Luuk 
and Richard. I hope I can fi nd a fair and sustainable balance 
between this ‘hobby job’ of mine and you. And I hope that we 
can do so in a world that is striving for more sustainability 
and greater fairness. Ladies and gentlemen, unlike some of 
the pessimists among you perhaps, I can see silver linings, and 
certainly one around Africa.73
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Notes
1 It was based on the Ghana TransNet research programme, 
funded by NWO, with Valentina Mazzucato as 
programme leader and Ernest Appiah, Mirjam Kabki and 
Lothar Smith as major collaborators. It was carried out 
at the University of Amsterdam and the Vrije Universiteit 
Amsterdam, with support from the African Studies 
Centre in Leiden. Together with Valentina Mazzucato, 
Jan Willem Gunning and the ASC’s Rijk van Dijk, I was 
promotor of the two PhD students. See http://www2.fmg.
uva.nl/ghanatransnet. My presentation is currently on my 
personal website at the University of Amsterdam: https://
home.medewerker.uva.nl/a.j.dietz. You can also fi nd an 
overview of all my activities and publications here, many 
as pdf fi les.
2 Joyce Millen, with thanks. She presented a paper on 
diaspora engagement in homeland health, with a 
comparative analysis of the US and Ghana on the one 
hand, and Senegal and France on the other.
3 Bob van der Bijl. The African Studies Centre shares an 
early history with the Netherlands-African Business 
Council. In December 1946 we started out together as the 
Africa Institute.
4 I paraphrase here the title of a shocking book by Michela 
Wrong on corruption in Kenya: It is Our Turn to Eat. 
The Story of an African Whistle-blower (Harper Collins 
Publishers, New York, 2009). The feeling of triumph 
in Dutch business circles was fed by the adoption of 
the recent report of the Dutch Scientifi c Council for 
Government Policy (WRR) on development assistance 
by the new Dutch government, and the expectation that 
there would be a major shift in development funding to 
the private sector, mainly in Africa, and involving many 
Dutch enterprises, particularly those dealing with food, 
agriculture and water. In its recent English translation, the 
WRR report is called ‘Less Pretension, More Ambition: 
Development Policy in Times of Globalization’ and was 
written by Peter van Lieshout, Robert Went and Monique 
Kremer (Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam, 2010).
5 The lecture at Hunan University in Changsha was about 
‘sustainable cities’. I would like to thank Li Qiu and 
Fu Rong for their invitation and hospitality. This trip 
not only gave me a chance to revisit Shanghai and the 
amazing EXPO grounds but also to give lectures and meet 
scientists at three of the leading African Studies Centres 
in China: in Jinhua (Zhejiang Normal University) and in 
Beijing (the IWAAS at the Chinese Academy of Sciences 
and Peking University). My thanks to Liu Hongwu, Liu 
Haifang and Li Anshan. 
6 Most of the African countries shared the Africa Joint 
Pavilion. The exceptions were South Africa, Nigeria, 
Angola, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Algeria. The African 
Union had its own section too. Morocco had a separate 
pavilion far away (because they have not been accepted 
as members of the African Union?). It is interesting to 
see how the African Union presented themselves on 
their website: ‘At the entrance of the pavilion, a gigantic 
African primitive sculpture with words on it reacts 
towards a glimmering globe, symbolizing the important 
role which Africa plays in environmental protection 
and coordination of world affairs. Entering the pavilion 
and walking along the curving corridor, visitors will 
learn about development of African countries, urban 
transformation, economic rise and cultural prosperity in 
Africa. Visitors will feel as if they were standing between 
the past and the future of Africa, impressed and inspired. 
In the central round area for forums, visitors can watch 
fi lms about urban development in Africa, especially about 
environmental protection and the use of clean energy 
in the process of development. These fi lms will tell the 
world about Africa’s vitality, progress in strides and the 
contributions of Africa’s harmonious development to 
world peace and development.’ See http://en.expo2010.
cn/c/en_gj_tpl_132.htm#gk.
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7 In the ‘Shanghai Expo Site National Pavilions Memorial 
Stamp Album’, the page about Africa was entitled ‘The 
hottest place under sunlight’ and added that ‘Africa, the 
second biggest continent on Earth, covers an area of 30.22 
million km², which accounts for 20.4% of the total land 
area. And it has a population of 1 billion (2009), which 
is approximately 15% of the world’s population. The 
name of Africa means the hottest place under sunlight.’ 
The real origin of the word ‘Africa’ is controversial: on the 
English-language Wikipedia website various hypotheses 
are presented: from afar (dust in Phoenician), ifri (cave in 
Berber) and af-rui-ka (birthplace in Egyptian) to aprica 
(sunny in Latin) and aphrica (without cold in Greek). See 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Africa#Etymology.
8 See www.padev.nl.
9 I would like to thank all the PADEV collaborators for a 
steep learning curve; in Africa in particular David Millar, 
Adama Belemviré, Francis Obeng and Richard Yeboah, 
and in the Netherlands Kees van der Geest, Dieneke de 
Groot, Wouter Rijneveld, and Fred Zaal. Among the 
students, Anika Altaf, Geneviève Audet-Bélanger, Roger 
Bymolt, Agnieszka Kazimierczuk, Aurélien Marsais and 
Jerim Obure deserve a special word of praise.
10 Robert Chambers is the author of many publications 
on participation. His book Revolutions in Development 
Inquiry (Eartscan, London, 2008) summarizes his life 
achievements. He spoke at a workshop entitled ‘Insights 
in Complexity’ that was organized at ICCO on September 
15, 2010 (www.padev.nl, under Forum). Robert Chambers 
has been an inspiration to me all my academic life.
11 In the last decade it has been trying to increase its leverage 
by connecting to like-minded donors (particularly in 
Scandinavia, the UK and Ireland) and promoting donor 
harmonization and the coherence agendas of the OECD 
DAC group. See www.worldconnectors.nl for the paper on 
coherence by a working group that I chaired.
12 Examples are the activities of companies like Unilever, 
Heineken, Ahold and the Rabobank. The Netherlands-
African Business Council (www.nabc.nl) plays a role 
in stimulating fairer, more sustainable and socially 
responsible relationships among the business sector in 
Africa. 
13 I recommend Amartya Sen’s Identity and Violence: The 
Illusion of Destiny (W.W. Norton & Co., New York, 2006). 
14 The book Dead Aid by Dambisa Moyo (Farrar, Straus 
& Giroux, New York, 2009, subtitled: Why Aid Is Not 
Working and How There Is Another Way for Africa) has 
poured a lot of oil on the fi re. Although with many more 
nuances, the IOB Evaluation of the Dutch Africa Policy 
1998-2006 was also quite critical. See the special issue 
of the Broker on ‘The Dutch Treatment’ (The Broker, 
February 6, 2008; www.thebrokeronline.eu).
15 Aid Watch provides interesting insight in the debate 
on the application of RCTs in evaluating development 
assistance. See http://aidwatchers.com/2009/07/
development-experiments-ethical-feasible-useful/. Also 
in the Netherlands there is a lot of debate in circles of 
evaluators of development programmes, e.g. at two recent 
conferences, one organized by Irene Guijt and colleagues 
(Conference ‘Evaluation Revisited’. May 20-21, 2010, 
www.cdi.wur.nl/UK/newsagenda/agenda/Improving_
the_Quality_of_Evaluative_Practice_by_Embracing_
Complexity.htm) and one organized by AIID and ISS 
(Amsterdam, October 4-7, 2010) on the Role of Impact 
Evaluation in Measuring the Effectiveness of Dutch Aid. 
See www.aiid.org. 
16 It is diffi cult to include those who are locally regarded 
as very rich or very poor. The very rich are too busy or 
elsewhere, and the very poor tend to exclude themselves 
or are not readily available to attend public meetings.
17 See www.padev.nl. A brief summary: our research design 
consisted of fi ve steps: (i) an inventory of development 
agents and their monitoring and evaluation practices; 
(ii) three workshops in areas with on-going major Dutch 
development involvement; (iii) three workshops in 
areas where Dutch development involvement has been 
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considerable but is no longer very prominent; (iv) three 
workshops in areas that were locally regarded as areas 
with little external involvement and also without Dutch 
development involvement; and (v) follow-up activities 
with development agencies. Many additional research 
activities took place. In the workshops we gradually 
developed an approach with ten units: (i) Time line 
(30 years); (ii) Changes in capabilities/capitals: natural/
physical/human/economic/ social-political/cultural; (iii) 
Wealth categorization: very rich/ rich/average/poor/very 
poor); (iv) A list of ‘projects’; their valuation and their 
perceived impact on capabilities (and information about 
the agency and ‘sector’); (v) Relations between trends 
(per ‘capital’ or ‘capability’) and interventions/’projects’; 
(vi) Selection of fi ve best and fi ve worst ‘projects’; (vii) 
A historical assessment of these fi ve best and fi ve worst 
‘projects’; (viii) The effects of the best fi ve and worst fi ve 
‘projects’ on wealth classes; (ix)An evaluation of reasons 
for assessing the best and worst ‘projects’; and (x) Personal 
and family life history forms (individual survey).
18 The capability approach merges insights from Amartya 
Sen and the DfID livelihoods approach. Anthony 
Bebbington, and Leo de Haan and Annelies Zoomers in 
the Netherlands are among the people who have made it a 
useful tool for understanding development dynamics. See, 
for example, L. de Haan & A. Zoomers (2005) ‘Exploring 
the Frontier of Livelihood Research’, Development and 
Change 36(1): 27-47.
19 The African Studies Centre was among the pioneers here. 
See, for example, W. van Binsbergen & R. van Dijk (eds), 
Situating Globality: African Agency in the Appropriation of 
Global Culture (Brill, Leiden, 2004).
20 There are often heated debates in our research workshops 
about the defi nition of wealth classes. However, many 
people agree that the difference between the poor and the 
ultra poor is the perception that for the poor there still is 
hope that one day they or their children might become 
well-to-do, while the ultra-poor are seen as hopeless, 
and also without hope themselves. These are people who 
are excluded or who exclude themselves from social life. 
The ultra poor are people who are often said to have no 
friends.
21 Published by Routledge Studies in Development 
Economics, Abingdon (2009) and based on his PhD that 
he defended at Radboud University Nijmegen.
22 My thanks to Ursula Oberst and Jos Damen for fi nding 
data for this section.
23 http://www.vaughns-1-pagers.com/history/world-
population-growth.htm. Used in T. Dietz, F. den 
Hertog & H. van der Wusten, Van Natuurlandschap 
tot Risicomaatschappij. De geografi e van de relatie 
tussen mens en milieu, (Amsterdam University Press, 
Amsterdam, 2008). See www.geonatris.eu. For current 
data, see L. Rowntree et al., Diversity amid Globalization. 
World Regions, Environment, Development (Pearson/
Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River NJ, 2009). According 
to the Population Reference Bureau (world population 
data sheet, 2010; www.prb.org/pdf2010/10wpds_eng.
pdf), Africa’s current population is 1030 million, and 
will increase to 1.4 billion in 2025 and 2.1 billion in 
2050. Current annual population growth for Africa as a 
whole is 2.4% (birth rate 37/1000; death rate 13/1000; 
net migration rate 1/1000). Infant mortality is 76/1000 
and the fertility rate is 4.7. As a result of the on-going 
population explosion, 15% of Africa’s population today is 
under 15 and only 3% is over 65 years of age.
24 According to a press release (De Volkskrant November 
24, 2010: 12), the number of AIDS-related deaths in the 
world has dropped from 2.1 million in 2004 to 1.8 million 
in 2009. In four of the fi ve most severely hit countries, 
Ethiopia, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe, the 
number of new cases fell by 25% between 2001 and 2009, 
mostly thanks to antiretroviral therapy programmes. See 
http://www.unaids.org/globalreport/.
25 FAOSTAT data, Harvested area, Africa total. Accessed 
November 23, 2010.
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26 Tracking Development is a comparative research 
programme, funded by the Netherlands Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, that is being undertaken by KITLV and 
the ASC. The programme leaders are David Henley 
(KITLV) and Jan Kees van Donge (ASC), with support 
from Ursula Oberst. One can and should argue about 
the social and environmental costs of these state-led 
pro-rural policies. In Indonesia, the massacres and 
authoritarian rule following 1965 hit the rural working 
poor. China’s Cultural Revolution and the preceding 
so-called Great Leap Forward were disastrous for many 
in the countryside. They simply did not survive it. The 
boost of agricultural production for the world and urban 
markets has also created major environmental problems 
(deforestation, decreased biodiversity, soil and water 
pollution, and erosion).
27 The fi bre crops are the exception.
28 See www.forestry.gov.uk (forestry statistics 2010). See 
M. Ros-Tonen & T. Dietz (eds), African Forests between 
Nature and Livelihood Resources’ (Edwin Mellen Press, 
Lewiston, 2005). The fourth edition of the UNEP’s ‘Global 
Environmental Outlook’ contains data (and warnings) as 
well. GEO4 was published in Nairobi in 2007.
29 See www.forestry.gov.uk (forestry statistics 2010). The 
forest area shrank from 23.2% of Africa’s total land area to 
20.7% between 1990 and 2010. 
30 See http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/
laureates/2004/maathai-bio.html.
31 Although there are many places where farmers have 
taken the initiative to improve their environment and 
where there has been serious support from governments, 
NGOs and international donor agencies. An inspiring 
study is More People, Less Erosion. Environmental Recovery 
in Kenya, by M. Tiffen, M. Mortimore & F. Gichuki 
(John Wiley & Sons, Chichester, 1994). See http://www.
drylandsresearch.org.uk/drylands_aboutus.html. In a 
recent research project I was involved in, we looked for 
further evidence and we did a meta-study about the way 
this book was received. See T. Dietz, with J.W. Gunning, A. 
Klaasse Bos & A. Zuiderwijk, ‘Optimistic Determinism or 
Explaining a Miracle’, in: K. Burger & F. Zaal, Sustainable 
Land Management in the Tropics. Explaining the Miracle, 
pp. 1-20 (Ashgate, Farnham, 2009). For West Africa, I 
recommend looking at the evidence presented by C. Reijg 
in his PowerPoint presentation, ‘Developing Another 
Green Revolution for Africa. Some Lessons from the 
Poorest Country in the World (Niger)’, not dated, at 
http://arts.monash.edu.au/ges/pgrad/midea/pdf/chris-
reij-sahel.pdf. In our own study, T. Dietz, R. Ruben & J. 
Verhagen, Impact of Climate Change on Drylands, With a 
Focus on West Africa (Kluwer, Dordrecht, 2004), there are 
many examples as well, especially in contributions by ASC 
researchers Mirjam de Bruijn, Han van Dijk and Wouter 
van Beek on Mali. 
32 The importance of studying a long period in this domain 
is clear from a beautiful publication edited by J-B. Gewald, 
S. Luning & K. van Walraven, The Speed of Change: Motor 
Vehicles and People in Africa, 1890-2000 (Brill, Leiden, 
2009).
33 In a recent presentation for the Dutch Knowledge 
Network on Sustainability, Climate and Energy 
(November. 11, 2010 in Utrecht), Jos Bruggink (IVM/
VU Amsterdam) presented interesting data that suggest a 
high correlation between the percentage of people living 
on less than US$2 a day and electricity coverage, but a 
low correlation between this poverty indicator and the 
household coverage of modern fuels. Even in African 
countries with ‘only’ 40%-60% poverty, the use of modern 
fuels is still very limited, unlike many Asian countries in 
that poverty segment. He used data from the OECD/IEA 
World Energy Outlook 2010 (www.worldenergyoutlook.
org) and poverty data provided by the World Bank: data.
worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.2DAY. 
34 One of the on-going research projects at the ASC deals 
with the explosion of mobile phones in Africa. See M. de 
Bruijn, F. Nyamnjoh & I. Brinkman, Mobile Phones: The 
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New Talking Drums of Everyday Africa (Langaa/African 
Studies Centre, Bamenda/Leiden, 2009).
35 UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs/
Population Division. World Urbanization Prospects (the 
2003 revision). New York. For the urban agglomerations 
with more than one million inhabitants: WDI online. 
Accessed November 18, 2010. According to Van Susteren’s 
Metropolitan World Atlas (010 Publishers, Rotterdam, 
2007) Cairo had 14 million inhabitants in 2000, Lagos 
10 million, Kinshasa 5.8 million and Johannesburg/
Rand area 5.5 million. A website with the pompous 
name ‘trueknowledge’ (www.trueknowledge.com) gives 
current fi gures of 17.7 million for Cairo, 6.6 million for 
Lagos (nobody knows….), 7.6 million for Kinshasa and 
3,9 million for Johannesburg (but that excludes the other 
cities in the Rand area). For West Africa, a very interesting 
French website gives lots of maps and fi gures for its fast-
growing cities: Africapolis. See http://www.afd.fr/jahia/
webdav/site/afd/users/administrateur/public/publications/
BT/0808ProjetFicheResumeeAfricapolisV4-en.pdf.
36 A major reason for higher life expectancy is the lower 
child death rates. In Africa mortality among the under-
fi ves for 1960 are not clear but were certainly far above 
200/1000, and for some countries even over 350/1000 
(Mali: 518/1000; Sierra Leone 390/1000; Malawi 
361/1000). See D.T. Jamison et al., Disease and Mortality 
in Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, Washington, 
2006) (2nd ed., Chapter 3). Data can be found at: 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK2296/table/
A168/?report=objectonly. In 2010 the fi gure for Africa as 
a whole had improved to 142/1000 but was still far below 
the targets set in the Millennium Development Goals and 
generally lower than in other parts f the world, although 
much better than 50 years ago.
37 Egypt: 16%, South Africa 15% and Tunisia 12%. World 
Bank WDR 1983.
38 According to the World Bank’s Africa website, PPP GDP 
per capita growth was 15% for Sub-Sahara Africa (US$ 
1,159 to US$ 1,328) between 1990 and 1999 and 54% 
(US$ 1,373 to US$ 2,114) between 2000 and 2008: http://
web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/
AFRICAEXT/0,,contentMDK:20563739~menuPK:16137
41~pagePK:146736~piPK:146830~theSitePK:258644,00.
html.
39 In 2001 the Development Centre of the OECD published 
Emerging Africa (OECD Publishing, Paris) by J-C. 
Berthélemy (and colleagues) and in 2010 another book 
was published with the same title: Emerging Africa. 
How 17 Countries Are Leading the Way by Steven Radelet 
(Center for Global Development, Washington). On the 
website of Radio Nederland Wereldomroep, attention is 
paid to ‘Emerging Africa’ too (www.rnw.nl/africa) and 
there are ever more websites referring to this concept 
and to business ventures or public-private partnerships 
under that logo. The recent annual business day of 
the Netherlands-African Business Council was called 
‘Emerging Africa’ too and its introductory statement 
goes a bit further than my ‘silverlining’; it promotes a 
platinum continent. This is what they had to say (and 
because it illustrates so nicely the euphoria in business 
circles I quote the complete introduction): ‘Africa is set 
to become the developing world’s next success story. In 
2008, Africa’s combined GDP reached $1.5 trillion - more 
than India or Brazil - and GDP growth rates averaged 5 
percent per year between 2002 and 2009. The IMF expects 
this outperformance of markets like Brazil, Russia and 
Eastern Europe to continue in the future. Foreign direct 
investment into Africa stood at $62 billion in 2008, seven 
times more than in the year 2000. Already per capita 
GDP is higher in Africa than in India, as is the number 
of middle-class households. Africa hosts 10 percent of 
the world’s reserves of oil, 40 percent of its gold, and 
80 to 90 percent of chromium and platinum metals. 
Yet, only a quarter of the economic growth is driven 
by the resource sector. Retail, agriculture, transport, 
and telecommunication all contribute signifi cantly to 
36
Prof.dr. Ton Dietz
the economic rise. McKinsey expects a 35% increase 
in spending power and 221 million extra basic-needs 
consumers by 2015. The continent has more than 500 
million people of working age today. By 2040, their 
number will exceed 1.1 billion. A quarter of the world’s 
arable land lies in Africa. Infrastructure investments 
on the continent have quadrupled in the past decade 
to a total of $12 billion in 2008. And the mobile phone, 
of which there are more than 450 million in use today, 
is only the prelude to a fundamental ICT revolution 
in Africa. These opportunities can be translated into 
revenues and profi ts. Publicly traded companies in Africa 
achieve an annual return on capital that is on average 
65% higher than that of their counterparts in China, 
India, Vietnam, or Indonesia, according to economist Paul 
Collier. Globally, Asia has been the main benefactor. The 
combined share of Africa’s exports to the European Union 
and the United States fell to 49 percent, from 73 percent 
in 1990 while Chinese imports from sub-Saharan Africa 
increased to over $13 billion, from $64 million. Now is 
the time for Europe to break that trend by becoming a 
valuable partner for Africa.’ See www.inschrijven.nabc.
nl/EmergingAfrica.aspx. Accessed December 3, 2010. It is 
interesting to note that my predecessor at the ASC, Leo de 
Haan, does not seem to share their (and my) optimism. 
In his inaugural lecture at the ISS entitled ‘Development 
Studies in Perspective. Sharing the Future at ISS’ (The 
Hague; ISS, Dies Natalis October 14, 2010), referring 
to the success of the South East Asian Tigers, he writes: 
‘There is no sign of African Lions yet’ (p. 4) and in the 
rest of his otherwise optimistic account there is hardly 
anything on Africa.
40 See http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/MDG_
FS_1_EN.pdf. In North Africa, the poverty situation is 
much better and improving as well. See http://mdgs.
un.org/unsd/mdg/Data.aspx. 
41 The Africapedia data can be found at http://
www.2logicstudios.com/bitweaver/wiki/view. Accessed 
December 4, 2010. 
42 These trends are followed closely every year in a special 
section of the Africa Yearbook.
43 In: A. Mazrui, General History of Africa VIII (Africa since 
1935), p. 503 (UNESCO, Paris, 1993).
44 Brockhaus Enzyklopädie, Part 1 (A-ATE), p. 163 
(Wiesbaden, 1966).
45 Based on T. Miller (ed.) Mapping the Global Muslim 
Population: A Report on the Size and Distribution of 
the World’s Muslim Population (Pew Research Center, 
Washington, 2009). A list of data for individual 
countries can be found at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
List_of_countries_by_Muslim_population#cite_note-
mgmpPRC-1.
46 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roman_Catholicism_in_
Africa.
47 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christianity_by_country.
48 In a detailed study, Amadu Jacky Kaba tried to do the 
same for the year 2001 in ‘The Spread of Christianity and 
Islam in Africa: A Survey and Analysis of the Numbers 
and Percentages of Christians, Muslims and Those who 
Practice Indigenous Religions’, The Western Journal of 
Black Studies 29(2): 553-570. He drew conclusions for 
the whole of Africa that can be summarized as follows: 
Muslims 45%, Christians 37%, Indigenous Religions: 
17%, Other: 1%, None: 0% (not a single one). 
49 Quoted in The Star (South Africa, April 4, 2005). See 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roman_Catholicism_in_
Africa.
50 See http://www.ascleiden.nl/library/abstracts/asa-online/. 
It provides a quarterly overview of journal articles and 
edited works on Africa in the fi eld of the social sciences 
and the humanities that are available in the ASC library.
51 This will be backdated to include all the six previous 
editions. We edit the Africa Yearbook with colleagues 
in Hamburg and Uppsala and it is published in Leiden 
by Brill Academic Publishers, our favourite publishing 
house. The sixth edition, Africa Yearbook 2009 edited by 
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A. Mehler, H. Melber & K. van Walraven, has just been 
published. 
52 Widening the African Studies Centre community to 
include additional fellows, associates and affi liates will 
put quite some additional demands on our support staff, 
and particularly on our secretariat (currently Gitty, Anne, 
Maaike and Mieke), our communications specialists 
(Marieke and Ann), our IT staff (Willem, Ursula and 
Harro) and our fi nance staff (Jan and Lenie), and also 
the functions of our library and documentation staff will 
gradually change. 
53 Council for the Development of Social Science Research 
in Africa, which is based in Dakar. See www.codesria.org. 
The ASC collaborates with CODESRIA in the Consortium 
Development Partnership (CDP) initiative.
54 The Organization for Social Science Research in Eastern 
and Southern Africa (OSSREA: www.ossrea.net/) is based 
in Addis Ababa. One of my books was published there: 
T. Dietz, M.A. Mohamed Salih & A. Ghaffar Mohamed 
Ahmed (eds), African Pastoralism. Confl ict, Institutions 
and Government (Pluto Press/OSSREA, London/
SterlingVirginia, 2001). 
55 The ASC has become a solid partner of the South Africa 
Netherlands research Programme on Alternatives in 
Development. See www.sanpad.org.za. The second edition 
was recently published of T. Dietz. A. Wadee, M. Keane & 
D. Hay (eds), Effective PhD Supervision, Mentorship and 
Coaching (Rozenberg Publishers, Amsterdam, 2010).
56 See www.aegis-eu.org.
57 Five of these centres in the Netherlands form an alliance 
of area institutes. In addition to the ASC, they are: the 
Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and 
Caribbean Studies (KITLV) in Leiden, the International 
Institute of Asian Studies in Leiden, with connections 
to the University of Amsterdam, the Centre for the 
Study and Documentation of Latin America (CEDLA) 
in Amsterdam and the International Institute of Social 
History (IISG) in Amsterdam.
58 These are ‘The State in Africa’ (with DAF, the unit in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs dealing with Africa) and the 
‘Land Academy’ (with DDE, the unit in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs dealing with the economy and partners 
elsewhere, and coordinated by IDS, Utrecht University). 
I would like to encourage that whenever the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and Dutch embassies work together 
with others in IS academies or knowledge networks and 
whenever it is about Africa, the ASC will be involved 
in some way or another as well. And I would like to 
encourage the same self-evident cooperation with Africa-
oriented knowledge activities in other ministries, NGOs, 
the media and in the private sector. 
59 This fi eld has been the core of the research activities of 
the African Studies Centre’s current research group on 
the Economy, Environment and Exploitation and the ASC 
can build on publications like: M. Rutten, A. Leliveld & D. 
Foeken (eds), Inside Poverty and Development in Africa. 
Critical Refl ections on Pro-poor Policies (Brill, Leiden, 
2008); M. Dekker, ‘Sustainability and Resourcefulness: 
Support Networks during Periods of Stress’, World 
Development 32(10): 1735-1751; D. Foeken, To Subsidise 
My Income. Urban Farming in an East-African Town 
(Brill, Leiden, 2006); and J. Hoorweg, D. Foeken & R. 
Obudho (eds), Kenya Coast Handbook: Culture, Resources 
and Development in the East African Littoral (Lit Verlag, 
Hamburg, 2000).
60 The newest addition to the ASC’s African Dynamics series, 
which is published by Brill in Leiden, specifi cally deals 
with the linkages between health care, well-being and 
economics. See M. Dekker & R. van Dijk (eds), Markets 
of Well-being. Navigating Health and Healing in Africa 
(Brill, Leiden, 2010). Books like these present a platform 
for researchers, visiting fellows at the ASC and invited 
guest authors, many of them from Africa, to explore new 
themes. For example, in this book the ASC’s contributions 
were written by the two editors, and Akinyinka Akinyoade, 
Walter van Beek, Dick Foeken, Wijnand Klaver, André 
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Leliveld and Marcel Rutten. Corine ‘t Hart is a former 
Research Masters student. The invited guest authors, 
some of whom are former visiting fellows, were Nadine 
Beckmann (Oxford), Christine Böhmig (Utrecht), Jérémie 
Gnimadi (Lomé), Alice Mboganie Mwangi (Nairobi), 
Kenneth Ombongi (Nairobi), Samuel Owuor (Nairobi), 
Bukola Adeyemi Oyeniyi (Leiden) and Robert Thornton 
(Johannesburg).
61 The African Studies Centre has a lot of experience in 
food and nutrition studies, with a host of publications 
which have been a result of the Food and Nutrition 
Studies Programme in Kenya, led by Jan Hoorweg. The 
recent research activities around urban agriculture are 
an offshoot. The governance arrangements around water 
provision are a current research theme too. My own 
research has many linkages with agriculture and water 
issues. I am currently chairing the Worldconnectors 
working group on food security (see www.
worldconnectors.nl). 
62 There are various building blocks in existing publications 
such as M. de Bruijn, R. van Dijk & D. Foeken (eds), 
Mobile Africa. Changing Patterns of Movement in Africa 
and Beyond (Brill, Leiden, 2001) and P. Konings & D. 
Foeken (eds), Crisis and Creativity. Exploring the Wealth of 
the African Neighbourhood (Brill, Leiden, 2006).
63 Building blocks are, for example, W. van Binsbergen & R. 
van Dijk (eds), Situating Globality. African Agency in the 
Appropriation of Global Culture (Brill, Leiden, 2004); Jan 
Abbink, ‘Suri Images: The Return of Exoticism and the 
Commodifi cation of an African Tribe’, Cahiers d’Etudes 
Africaines 49(4): 893-924; and Ben Soares & R. Otayek 
(eds), Islam, état et société en Afrique (Karthala, Paris, 
2009). 
64 Most of the work of ASC’s current Social Movements 
and Political Culture in Africa Research Group is in this 
fi eld but many others at the Centre have contributed as 
well. Out of many of the ASC’s highlights I would like 
to mention J. Abbink, M.de Bruijn & K. van Walraven 
(eds), Rethinking Resistance, Revolt and Violence in African 
History Brill, Leiden, 2003); J. Abbink & I. Van Kessel 
(eds), Vanguard or Vandals. Youth, Politics and Confl ict in 
Africa (Brill, Leiden, 2005); M. de Bruijn, R. van Dijk & 
J-B. Gewald (eds), Strength beyond Structure. Social and 
Historical Trajectories of Agency in Africa (Brill, Leiden, 
2007); S. Ellis & I. van Kessel Movers and Shakers. Social 
Movements in Africa (Brill, Leiden, 2009); P. Konings, 
Neoliberal Bandwagonism. Civil Society and the Politics 
of Belonging in Anglophone Cameroon (African Studies 
Centre/Langaa, Bamenda, 2009); and M. Rutten & S, 
Owuor, ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction: Land, Ethnicity 
and the 2007 Elections in Kenya’, Journal of Contemporary 
African Studies 27(3): 305-325.
65 Until now this theme has clearly not received much 
scholarly attention at the ASC. It is mainly our 
younger staff members who have been active in this 
fi eld, for example, Lotje de Vries who published ‘The 
Developmental Impact of the Asian Drivers on Senegal’, 
The World Economy 32(11): 1563-1585, and Mayke Kaag 
who, with Oumma Aide, published ‘Les ONG islamiques 
transnationales au Tchad’, in R. Otayek & B. Soares (eds), 
Islam, état et société en Afrique (Karthala, Paris, 2009).
66 See K. Ludeman & E. Erlandson, Alpha Male Syndrome 
(Harvard Business School Press, Boston, 2006).
67 Soon after I started my new job, I was happy to see 
that Inge Brinkman (assisted by Anne-Lot Hoek) had 
published Bricks, Mortar and Capacity Building: A 
Socio-Cultural History of SNV Netherlands Development 
Organisation. (Brill, Leiden, 2010). I recommend this 
book to anyone who is interested in the history of 
Dutch development assistance and I hope many Dutch 
development agencies will be as bold as SNV were in 
asking independent researchers to write their histories. 
The African Studies Centre is ready to assist them.
68 Tropenbos International (www.tropenbos.org) is a 
non-governmental knowledge organization based in 
Wageningen, the Netherlands. It was established in 1986 
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in response to ongoing concerns about the disappearance 
and degradation of tropical rain forests worldwide. It 
undertakes research, capacity building and institutional 
development, with programmes in the Congo Basin 
(Cameroon and DR Congo), Colombia, Ghana, Indonesia, 
Vietnam and Suriname. René Boot, Rudy Rabbinge, 
Sam Nketiah and many others, thanks for a pioneering 
learning environment. 
69 Both Ends supports organizations in developing countries 
in fi ghting poverty and working towards sustainable 
environmental management. Its head offi ce is in 
Amsterdam. I am looking forward to being a member of 
your Board. Thanks Danielle Hirsch for your confi dence 
and for being able to see a silver lining everywhere. I 
am proud to say that two of my former PhD students 
now work for Both Ends: Tobias Schmitz and Karen 
Witsenburg, after having done fascinating research in 
South Africa and northern Kenya respectively. (In Karen’s 
case with Adano Wario Roba, one of our many colleagues 
at Moi University’s School of Environmental Studies, who 
was supported in the MHO (NUFFIC) programme that 
Annemieke and I coordinated on the Dutch side).
70 See www.princeclauschair.nl.
71 I still use some of the recipes in D. Foeken & K. van der 
Meulen, Eten met Gerrit (ASC, Leiden, 1990), which, I am 
told, was one of the ASC’s bestsellers!
72 The RESMA Board is currently chaired by Robert Ross, 
the Advisory Board by Georg Frerks and the NVAS by 
Michel Doortmont (http://www.afrikastudies.nl/nvas-
engels.html). I thank you and your colleagues for your 
dedication!
73 My thanks to Ann Reeves and Gitty Petit for supporting 
me in the writing of this inaugural lecture!
